Topics in Macroeconomics: Modelling Information, Learning and Expectations

PhD Course, Economics Department, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE, Fall 2009

Tuesdays 17.00 and Thursdays 17.00, Room 23.S03
Office Hours: Mondays 11.00-12.30, Room 23.408
Midterm: Thursday December 3, 17.00-19.00, Room 20.017 Jaume I (NOTE CHANGE IN ROOM!)


Overview

Many economic decisions depend on expectations about either inherently unobservable variables or about future realisations of a variable. Different theories of expectations formation will therefore have different implications for economic behavior. This course aims at equipping students with the tools needed to model two alternative theories to the full information rational expectations hypothesis: (i) Imperfectly informed, but model consistent, expectations and (ii) boundedly rational expectations, that is, expectations formed without complete knowledge of the structure of the economy. Both theories have delivered interesting results, ranging from positive predictions about the dynamics of aggregate time series and asset prices, to normative implications about the value of public information and the design of monetary policy. The substantive results from the literature will be discussed along with the specific techniques that were employed to derive them. The Kalman filter is an indispensable tool for modelling information and learning, and some time will initially be devoted to deriving the filter and exploring its properties.


Syllabus

Homework 1 (due Tuesday November 24)

Homework 2 (due Thursday December 10)

Exercise Questions for midterm

Histograms of results

Lecture 1
Overview and some basics
Lecture Notes 1

Lecture 2
Solving Full Information Rational Expectations Models
Lecture Notes 2
MatLab Code

Lecture 3
The Kalman Filter
Lecture Notes 3

Lecture 4
Island Models
Lecture Notes 4
Some international evidence on output-inflation tradeoffs , Lucas, AER (1973)
A theory of demand shocks, Lorenzoni, AER (forthcoming)

Lecture 5
Private and Public Information
Lecture Notes 5
Social Value of Public Information, Morris and Shin, AER (2002)
Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) is actually pro transparencey, not con, Svensson, AER (2006)
Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) is actually pro transparencey, not con: A Reply, Morris, Shin and Tong, AER (2006)

Lecture 6
The Information Revealed by Market Outcomes
Lecture Notes 6
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets, Grossman and Stiglitz, AER (1980)

Lecture 7
Endogenous Information Choice
Chapter 3 and 6 from Laura Veldkamps (NYU/STERN) forthcoming book
Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention, Mackowiak and Wiederholt, AER (2009)
Slides

Lecture 8
Bounded Rationality and Learning
Lecture Notes 8

Lecture 9
Bayesian Robustness and Learning
The Conquest of U.S. Inflation: Learning and Robustness to Model Uncertainty, Cogley and Sargent, RED (2005)
Slides