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Topics in Macroeconomics: Modelling Information, Learning and Expectations
PhD Course, Economics Department, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE, Fall 2009
Tuesdays 17.00 and Wednesdays 17.00, Room 40.152
Office Hours: Mondays 11.00-12.30, Room 23.408
The lecture on November 24 will be in room 40.146 at 15.00-17.00
There will be no lecture on November 30
Midterm: 15.00 -17.00 Friday December 3, Room 20.055 Jaume I
Overview
Many economic decisions depend on expectations about either inherently
unobservable variables or about future realizations of a variable. Different
theories of expectations formation will therefore have different
implications for economic behavior. This course aims at equipping students
with the tools needed to model two alternative theories to the full
information rational expectations hypothesis: (i) Imperfectly informed, but
model consistent, expectations and (ii) boundedly rational expectations,
that is, expectations formed without complete knowledge of the structure of
the economy. Both theories have delivered interesting results, ranging from
positive predictions about the dynamics of aggregate time series and asset
prices, to normative implications about the value of public information and
the design of monetary policy. The substantive results from the literature
will be discussed along with the specific techniques that were employed to
derive them. Lecture notes will be provided, but reading articles will also
be required.
Syllabus
Homework 1 (due Tuesday November 23)
Homework 2 (due Friday December 10)
Exercise Questions for midterm
Last year's midterm
Histogram of homework and midterm results
Lecture 1 Overview and some basics
Lecture Notes on Difference Equations
Lecture Notes on Solving RE models
Lecture 2 The Kalman Filter
Lecture Notes on the Kalman Filter
Lecture 3 Island Models
Lecture Notes on Lucas Island model
Some international evidence on output-inflation tradeoffs , Lucas, AER (1973)
A theory of demand shocks, Lorenzoni, AER 2009
Lecture 4 Private and Public Information
Lecture Notes Private and Public Information
Social Value of Public Information, Morris and Shin, AER (2002)
Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) is actually pro transparencey, not con, Svensson, AER (2006)
Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) is actually pro transparencey, not con: A Reply, Morris, Shin and Tong, AER (2006)
Lecture 5 Higher Order Expectations
Slides
Forecasting the forecasts of others, Townsend, JPE (1983)
Dynamic Higher Order Expectations, Nimark (2010)
Lecture 6 The Information Revealed by Prices
Lecture Notes on The Information Revealed by Prices
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets, Grossman and Stiglitz, AER (1980)
Lecture 7 Endogenous Information Choice
Rational Inattention, Palgrave entry by Wiederholt
Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention, Mackowiak and Wiederholt, AER (2009)
Slides
Lecture 8 Bounded Rationality and Learning
Evolution and Intelligent Design, Sargent, AER (2008)
Lecture Notes on Bounded Rationality and Learning
Lecture 9 Bayesian Robustness and Learning
The Conquest of U.S. Inflation: Learning and Robustness to Model Uncertainty, Cogley and Sargent, RED (2005)
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